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PRIVILEGE OF NON-RESIDENT ATTORNEY FROM
SERVICE OF CIVIL PROCESS
The privilege of attorneys from service of civil process
seems to have had its origin in the ancient common law doctrine
of privilege from arrest. For almost six hundred years in England men who were unable to pay their debts were subject to
arrest and imprisonment.1 It was during this era that many
privileges were granted to special classes. The doctrine of privilege from arrest took root and flourished in this time of special
privileges. On the theory that witnesses, jurors, suitors and
attorneys might be intimidated from attendance upon the courts
and that the courts would be thus hampered in the administration of justice, it was thought necessary that these persons
should be immune from arrest while in attendance upon and in
going to and returning from the courts.
We find this doctrine and the reasons for it stated in various
ways by the great legal writers. Bacon expresses it thus:
"It hath lately been laid down by the court of C. P. as a ge~Aeral
rule that all persons who have relation to a suit which calls for their
attendance, whether they are compelled to attend by process or not,
are entitled to privilege from arrest eundo et redeundo, provided they
come bona fide. And2 in this description bail and barristers, upon the
circuit are included,"

Mr. Blackstone stated it in this manner:
"Attorneys and all other persons attending the courts of justice
(for attorneys being officers of the court, are supposed to be there attending) are not liable to be arrested by the ordinary processes of the
cburt, but must be sued by a bill of privilege as being personally present in court." 3

" This practice began with the "Statutes of Merchants" in 1288 and
was not abolished until the year 1868. Statutes Victoria, 32 and 33,
page 571.
2 Bacon's Abridgement, 1849 Ed. Vol. 8, page 171.
2 3 Brackstone Commentaries, star page 289.
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Again we find it said:
"The parties to a suit and their attorneys and witnesses are, for
the sake of public.justice, protected from arrest in coming to, attending
upon, and returning from the courts." '

Mr. Weeks has expressed the reason a little more clearly:
"It was an ancient privilege of attorneys to be exempt from arrest
on mesne process, or being held to bail, because attorneys, being obliged to. attend officially, and as the law presumes, continually, upon
the courts, they were always amenable to their own courts, and could
not be drawn away to attend others. . . . These privileges arose
from the supposition that the business of their clients would suffer by
their being drawn elsewhere."'

Lord Halsbury says:
"A solicitor whilst engaged In his professional duties in going to
or coming from the place of trial on behalf of a client is privileged from
arrest on civil but not on criminal process." e

However, the ancient rule which became established in England obtained no acceptance as an entirety, in the jurisprudence
of this country; and a privilege of such a nature and extent
could not well exist in the light of American institutions nor
under present day conditions.7 In some states the privilege from
arrest has been modified 8 or repealed and in many states it seems
'1 Tidd's Practice, page 195.
0'Weeks,
Attorneys at Law, sections 107, 108.
8
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 26, Solicitors, page 726, section
1198. See also In re Freston, 11 Q. B. D. 545, 552, (1883).
" Central Trust Company v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, 74 Fed. 442, (1896). But see Brooks v. State ex rel Richards,
3 Boyce (Del.) 1, 79 Atl. 790, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126, Ann. Cas. 1915A
1133 (1911), where the court says in part, "The privilege of parties
to judicial proceedings, as well as witnesses, attorneys, judges, jurors
and certain other officers of the court, of going to the place where they
are held, and remaining as long as necessary, and returning wholly
free from restraint of process in other civil proceedings, has long been
settled and liberally enforced. The rule is of ancient origin, and Is
mentioned In the year books as early as Henry VI. It came to us out
of the common law with only such modifications as were required to
make its principle harmonize with American institutions and to be in
accord with American jurisprudence. . . . The privilege arises out
of the authority and dignity of the court, It is founded on the necessities of judicial administration, it has for its primal object the protection of the court and not the immunity of the person, and is extended
or withheld as judicial necessities require."
' In Illinois by statute attorneys are still exempt from arrest on
civil process while attending court. Cahill, Illinois Revised Statutes,
(1927), Chap. 13, section 9. But see Robbins v. Lincoln, discussed
ifra, where the Federal Court in construing the statute said the privilege conferred by it did not extend to the mere service of summons.
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never to have been recognized or acknowledged. 9 Yet we find
that some American courts have attempted by analogy to apply
the dodtrine of the common law in this country, and out of the
common law doctrine of privilege from arrest have tried to coin
a rule exempting certain classes from service of civil process.
Even under the rule of the old common law, where physical
restraint was not sought the reason for, the privilege no longer
existed. And so service of process in civil actions unaccompanied
by arrest did not Violate the privilege. Today, when arrest is no
longer the ordinary means for bringing a suit, suitors, witnesses
and attorneys, residing within the jurisdiction enjoy only the protection afforded by the dignity of the court. However, nonresidents receive special considerations. Thus we find that in
every state in our union non-resident witnesses are privileged
from service of summons while in the state for the purpose of
attending judicial proceedings. 10 A majority of jurisdictions
apply the same rule in favor of non-resident parties. 1 The
ground upon which such exemption is based is public policy;
that is for the purpose of protecting the courts from interruption and delay and for the promotion of ihe free and fair admin2
istration of justice.1
But what of the privilege of attorneys from service of civil
process while attending court in jurisdictions other than those,
of their residence ? To attempt to answer that question is the
purpose of this article. The question seems to have been before

'Greenleal v. People's Bank, 133 N. C. 292, 45 S. E. 638, 63 L. R. A.

499, 98 Am. St. Rep. 709 (1903).

33 Harvard Law Review 723. See note 15.
See also 10 Columbia Law Review 167.
" 21 Columbia Law Review 494. See also Diamond v. Earre, 217
Mass. 499, 105 N. E. 363, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 984
(1914), where the reason Is stated thus, "Non-residents cannot be comn Ibid. see note 16.

pelled to come within the jurisdiction to testify. As such testimony.
may be essential in the due administration of Justice, they ought to be
protected in coming voluntarily into our courts to aid in the ascertainment of truth and in the accomplishment of right results by the courts.
It is not merely a privilege of the person; it is a prerogative exerted
by the sovereign power through the courts for the furtherance of the
ends of Justice. Every party has a right to testify in his own behalf.
He cannot do this freely, if*hampered by the hazard that he may become entangled in other litigation in foreign courts. The rule is applied almost universally in behalf of witnesses coming from a foreign

state. It Is extended generally to defendants living outside the state
where the litigation is pending." See further the reason expressed in
Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N. J. Law Rep. 420 (1817), decided more than one
hundred years ago.
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the courts comparatively few times:.'
A thorough search has
revealed only sixteen cases directly in point and not all of those
have been decided by courts of last resort. The cases, which
have arisen in widely separated jurisdicti6ns, group themselves
into two distinct classes: (1) Those where the attorney is served
in a county other than that of his residence, and (2) those where
at the time of the service the attorney is in a state other than
that in which he resides. In both instances he is there solely for
the purpose of attending judicial proceedings. It will be convenient for our present purposes to consider them in .this order.

SERvicE iN CoxTny OT

,RTaHAx THAT OF ATToRNEY's RsDENcE
The first case presenting this phase of the question arose in
Pennsylvania in 1889.14 A practicing attorney of the courts of
,Allegheny county, residing in Butler county, went to the city
of Pittsburg for the purpose of trying a case before the court of
common pleas of Allegheny county. After the heariAg, while
waiting for a train to go to his home in Butler, he was served
with summons. The court held the service proper, saying the
privilege was the privilege of the court rather than that of the
attorney. It -was admitted that there was good reason for
exempting from service of process an attorney from another
county in attendance upon the United States courts or on the
Supreme court, and that good reason might exist for extending
the privilege to an attorney from another county casually here
and admitted to practice for a special case. However, the court
could see no necessity for exempting its own attorneys from service of process, except in the presence of the court. Many attorneys residing in other counties practiced at the Allegheny bar
and it was the opinion of the court that the cause of justice would
not be served by granting such attorneys privilege from service
in the county in which most all their business was transacted.
-hy should their privilege be greater than that of the attorneys
residing in Allegheny county?
Three years later another Pennsylvania court denied the
privilege. 15 In that case the attorney, a resident of Allegheny
1 One court has spoken of it as a novel proposition. See concurring14opinion of Clark, C. J., in Greenleaf v. People's Bank, supra note 9.
Parker Savings Bank v. McCandless, 33 Pitts. L. T. 273, 6 Pa. Co.
Ct. 327 (1889).

Tyrone Bank v. Doty, 2 Pa. Dist. 588, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 287 (1892).
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county and.a member of the bar of Juniata county, took part in
a trial in Juniata county and while returning home was served
with summons in Blair county. The court cited the former case
of Bank v. McCandless, discussed supra, as controlling this case,
saying that an attorney who travelled from one county to another in the practice of his profession could not claim exemption
from the service of a writ while en route to or returning from
court. The facts of this case make it a stronger case for the
denial of the privilege than the first case. Here the service was
in an intermediate county, while in that case the attorney was
served in the county where he was a member of the bar. The
attorney in addition to acting as counsel had testified as a witness in the case in Juniata county. But the court said that his
attendance was voluntary and not in obedience to any subpoena
of the court and the fact that he was sworn as a witness did not
affect the question, since he was not in attendance as a witness.
The first recognition of the privilege in the type of ;case
under discussion came in 1897.16 In the Michigan case we have
a slight variation of the problem. An attorney, who had argued
a case before the Supreme court, was served with summons while
on his' way home. 17 The circuit court denied his motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground of privilege. 'But on a writ
of mandamus the Supreme court upheld the attorney's contention that he was privileged. The court reasoned that the common
law privilege from service of process had npt been affected by a
statute relating to arrest on civil process. It cited Taylor on
Evidence, page 1126,18 in support of wl~at it calls the common
law rule. A glance at the section cited will suffice to show that
it deals only with arrest on civil process, and not with mere
Hoffman v. Bay Circuit Judge, 113 Mich. 109, 71 N. W. 480, 38 L.
R. A. T663, 67 Am. St. Rep. 458 (1897).
" See Young v. Armstrong, 13 W. N. C. (Pa.) 313 (1883), where
the court seems to have upheld the privilege. But the question in that
case was whether the attorney had waived the privilege by riot claiming
it in time.
I "In order to encourage witnesses to come forward voluntarily,
they are not only protected from any action for defamation with respect to such statements as they may make in the course of the judicial
proceedings, but in common with parties, barristers,solicitors and in
short all persons who have that relation to a suit -which calls for their
attendance, they are protected from arrest on any civil process, while
going to the place of trial, while attending there for the purposes ot
the cause, and while returning home." Italics are the writer's.
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service of summons, not entailing arrest. The case of Central
Trust Company v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, discussed infra, was also cited by the court. Many of the cases
referred to in the opinion are not in point and it is thought that
none of them sustains its conclusion, We are much surprised to
find such a poorly reasoned opinion from a state court which
enjoys so high a standing.
An Ohio circuit court sustained the privilege on the ground
of public policy. 19 An attorney residing in Putnam county was
served in Hancock county, immediately after the hearing of a
case in which he was counsel. The service was quashed on the
ground that public policy in the proper administration of justice recognized the necessity of safe conduct of counsel to and
from foreign jurisdictions, that counsel whose presence is necessary at the forum wherein the rights of the suitor are pending
may be free to come and go without incurring liability or submitting to ineQnvonience, which in order to avoid he must absent
himself from the jurisdiction in which the client's interests are
being determined. "The rule applies to counsel as well as to the
suitor. It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
presence of counsel is always necessary, and at times and upon
occasions far more necessary than the presence of the client him20
self."
For sixteen years following the decision of the Ohio case
no court seems to have been confronted with the precise question. We find it next presented in Arkansas. 21 Here, the attorney, a resident of Jackson county, was engaged in the trial of a
case in Pulaski county. While thus engaged he was called to the
door of the courtroom and served with civil process. The lower
court sustained defendant's motion to quash the service, but the
Supreme court in a well reasoned opinion denied the existence
of any such privilege as that claimed by the attorney. Arkansas
had a statute exempting witnesses from other counties under
like circumstances. The same immunity had been extended to
suitors by judicial decision. But the court refused to further
extend the rule by analogy to include attorneys, saying that the
public policy element was not present. The court said, in part,
Whitman v. Sheets, 20 Oh. Cir. Ct. 1 (1899).
20Ibid. page 3.
2_Paul
v. Stuckey, 126 Ark. 389, 189 S. W. 676 (1916).
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"So far as the interest of the public is concerned, the ends of
justice are fully satisfied when suitors are protected in the right
to be heard by themselves and counsel. The selection of counsel
by suitors is a matter of purely private concern and not of pubile
interest. It is not essential to the administration of justice, and
no rule of public policy therefore requires, that courts should
extend the privilege, which was intended for the protection of
its own authority and dignity and to enable it to do justice between the paizties, so as to grant immunities to attorneys from
their individual liabilities. The attorney is only the alter ego of
his client in the limited sense that he may plead in matters pertaining to his client's cause. The attorney is not subject, like
the suitor, to the process of the court issued to enable it to carry
out its orders in pending cases. He cannot stand in his client's
shoes as to the consequences of the judicial proceedings. Therefore it is not necessary for the courts, in order to deal out justice
between parties litigant, to shield a non-resident attorney from
the service of process in a matter that concerns him' only, and
which in no manner affects his client's cause."
SERvICE 3N STATE OTnnn THAN TnAT OF ATTORNEY'S RESIDENCE
The first case presenting this phase of the question likewise
arose in Pennsylvania, 22 but is was decided almost forty years
before Bank v. Mcandless, discussed supra. The attorney was
served with civil process while attending in Pittsburg, in the
double capacity of a stockholder and attorney of W. B. Co., upon
a notice to take depositions in a case pending in the United States
Supreme Court between the state of Pennsylvania and W. B. Co.
The service of the writ was set aside on the ground of privilege.
The court seems to have based its decision on the case of Wicks
v. Broum 23 decided the previous January by the same court, in
which the court had held that a counsellor at law coming from
another county to attend to the cases of his clients, before the
Supreme court of the state, is exempt from service of a summons
"Holmes v. Nelson, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 217 (1850).
n This case seems never to have been reported. A thorough search
of the digests and tables of cases fails to disclose it. The writer has
noted one other reference to it in addition to that in the above case.
But In neither Is there any indication of where it Is reported. The
writer strongly believes that the case held that the attorney was privi-.
leged from arrest on summons, rather than -from mere service.
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in a civil action in going, remaining, and returning. After setting forth the reasons for the rule, the court said with reference
to the case of Wicks v. Brown, "It was also shown that this
exemption extends to the service of summons, as well as to arrest, because our summons answers substantially the same purpose as the capias did, under the English practice, in enforcing
appearance, and the exception did not in most cases, in England,
extend to a summons, because the place of service could not
affect the place of trial as it does here." The court goes on to
say that none of these principles was disputed by counsel, but
that the case was attempted to be distinguished on the grounds,
(1) that the attorney was a resident of another state, a foreigner,
and (2) that the proceeding out of which the immunity was
claimed to arise was before the United States Supreme Court.
It was decided that these did not distinguish the case from the
24
general rule.
This type of case seems not to have confronted the courts
again until the year 1886, when we have two courts refusing to
recognize any such immunity on the part of an attorney. One
is a Pennsylvania case. 25 There a member of the Philadelphia
bar, who had been residing in New York for some years, but who
according to some evidence, continued to practice in Philadelphia, was held not exempt from service of a summons while in
Philadelphia for the purpose of atteilding court. The court
based its decision on the ground that he was still a member of
the Philadelphia bar and practicing there, and he must take this
privilege of practicing-there cur onere. Cotnsel for the defendant relied upon the cases of Holmes v. Nelson, discussed supra,
and Young v. Armstrong.26 The court however did not consider
those cases as controlling. It is interesting to note that the two
first cases in which the question as to the privilege of an attorney
from another state was asserted were decided by Pennsylvania
courts. All four cases are from inferior courts. Although the
question of the attorney's privilege has been before the courts of
Pennsylvania more often than those of any other jurisdiction,
-"Itis not exactly clear Just what the court means by the general
rule. It is believed that it refers to the case of Wicks v. Brown, as laying down a rule that attorneys within the state are exempt while attending upon the supreme court.
Coleman v. Tim, 18 W. N. C. (Pa.) 240 (1886).
Spra note 17.
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yet we have no decision from the highest court in that state. In
both instances the attorney from another state was denied the
exemption. And while in an early case the attorney from another state was held privileged, yet in the case just discussed
the immunity was refused.
The other case in 1886 appeared in the Federal circuit court
in Illinois. 27 An attorney from Cincinnati was served with summons while attending the trial of a cause in the Federal court in
Illinois. The court in dehying the exemption was called upon to
construe an Illinois statute which provided as follows: "Al
attorneys -andcounsellors at law, judges, clerks, sheriffs, and all
other officers of the several courts within this state, shall be liable
to be arrested and held to bail, and shall be subject to the same
legal process, and may in all respects b'e prosecuted and proceeded against in the same court, and in the same manner, as
other persons, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, provided, nevertheless, said judges, counsellors, or at
torneys, clerks, sheriffs or other officers of the several courts,
shall be privileged fr am arrest while they are attending court,
and while going to and returning from court.' '8 The court said
that the statute implied by the word "arrest" a detention of the
person within the meaning of the word in contradistinction to
mere service of summons. That although the proviso used the
word arrest,yet it was evident that it related back to the phrase
in the body of the section, shall be liable to be arrested aMd held
to bail, And therefore that the only privilege granted the attorney by the statute was the privilege from such service of process
as involved imprisonment or holding to bail. That as it construed the statute a resident attorney could'be served with summons while in attendance upon the courts and an attoirney from
another state enjoyed no greater privilege.
Ten years later the Federal circuit court in Wisconsin was
asked to pass upon this question. 2 9 A New York attorney went
to Wisconsin to attend the Federal court for a dlient. Immediately after the hearing and before he had had reasonable time
to take his departure he was served with a subpoena requiring
v. LIncoln, 27 Fed. 342 (1886).
"Robbins
2
Italics are the writer's.
Central Trust Company v. Milwaukee d St. Paul Railway Company, 74 Fed. 442 (1896).
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him to attend hearings as a witness. The service was declared
invalid on the ground of privilege. -The court referred to the
common law rule of privilege from arrest and said that the immunity necessarily extended to the attorney representing the
cause of his client before the court. It further said that the
rule applied to the service of civil process where there was no
arrest. None of the authorities cited in the opinion are directly
in point, but a few of them contain dictum. The court seemed
very much inclined to extend the privilege and was evidently
hunting for some ground upon which to stand. The real basis
of the case seems to have been, that if the service were held valid
it would compel the attorney's attendance at a time when his
attention was greatly needed by matters of these same clients in
the courts of other states.30 This appears a very loose ground
upon which to rest the case.
In a case, the facts of which are very similar to those of the
one just discussed, the North Carolina court 3l answered the
question by saying that a non-resident attorney in the state to
represent his clients in a matter pending in the Federal courts
is not privileged from service of summons. Clark, C. J., stated
that the proposition .was a novel one in a land where equality
before the law is the ruling principle and where special privilege
to any class of our citizens is not only not recognized by law but
is prohibited by the Constitution.32 He cites the case of Hoffman v. Circuit Judge, discussed supra, saying that the authorities which appear in the opinion do not support its conclusion.
He also criticizes the basis of the decision in Central Trust Company v. Milwaukee, etc., discussed supra, saying that the result
is not sustained by any previous authority.
Five years after the North Carolina case a New York
Supreme court denied the existence of any such privilege on the
part of non-resident attorneys.3 3 In passing upon the question
the court said, "The only non-residents who appear to be exempt
from service while attending court in this state are necessary or
interested parties, suitors, witnesses or creditors in bankruptcy.
The attorney was counsel for a large railway company.
nGreenleaf v. People's Bank¢, 133 N. C. 292, 45 S. E. 638, 63 L. R. A.
499, 98 Am. St. Rep. 709 (1903).
22The concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., in this case is a splendid
example of legal reasoning.
"Kutner v. Hoanett, 59 Misc. Rep. 21, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1068 (1908).
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The reason for the exemption of such persons, viz., the promotion
of the due and efficient administration of justice, fails when it is
sought to be applied to foreign attorneys at law, and to extend
the rule to them would enable foreign attorneys to practice law
constantly in this state and at the same time extend to them immunity from the process of the courts in this state." This the
court was not willing to do.
After the lapse of a few years the question is again before
the Federal court and again the privilege is recognized.3 4 A
resident of Illinois, who had sued a citizen of Iowa in the Federal district court in Iowa, employed Mr. Silas H. Strawn, a
prominent Illinois attorney, to represent him. Mr. Strawn went
to Iowa to attend to the case. After the trial was over and while
waiting for the verdict of the jury Mr. Strawn was served with
summons issued out of the same court. The motion to vacate
the service of the summons on the ground of privilege was
sustained by the court. It stated that there was a spirit of
comity between all courts, national and state, by reason of which
any court allowed on motion an attorney from another jurisdiction to appear in a particular case. The court thought that
it was not within the spirit of fair dealing and such comity for
it to hold that if a lawyer from another state came into this court
he did so at the peril of being sued. The cases of Hoffman v.
Bay, Circuit Judge and Central Trust Company v. Milwaukee,
etc., discussed supra, were cited in support of the view taken by
the court. Robbins v. Lincoln and Greenleaf v. People's Bank
were noted as holding adversely to the position of the court, but
they were declared n6t to be persuasive.
During the same year we have a state court declaring that
non-resident lawyers coming into the state for the sole purpose
of attending to the trial of a case in court are immune from the
service of civil process. 35 The South Carolina court dismissed
the question with only a few remarks. It said that a former
case had settled the question as to parties and witnesses and the
same principle applied to attorneys. No authority was referred
to by the court.
"Read v. NJeff, 207 Fed. 890 (1913).

" Wifiams v. Hatcher, 95 S. C. 49, 78 S. E. 615 (1913).
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A Minnesota case refused to extend the privilege to an attorney.38 A South Dakota lawyer came into Minnesota for the purpose of taking the deposition of a witness residing there, for use
in the trial of an action in South Dakota. Here we have a slightly
different situation. The business of the attorney is not to attend
court, but rather to secure a deposition. The North Carolina
case was cited in support of the stand taken by the court. The
court took the position that since there was no cause pending in
Minnesota with reference to which the defendant came into the
state, the rule applied to non-resident witnesses was not applicable to an attorney under the facts of this case.3 7 Is the case
weaker because the attorney did not come into the state to attend
court, but only to take the deposition of a witness to be used in d
trial in another state ?
The following year the problem was presented to the California court in a slightly different form from any it had ever
taken before.38 An Illinois attorney while in California was
served with process issued out of a state court. The motion to
quash was based upon the fact that the defendant was in California for the purpose of assisting as an attorjney in connection
with two cases then pending in the United States District, Court
for the southern district of California. It was not aleged or
claimed that 7ie was an attorney of record in the two cases, or
entitled to practice, but his affidavit did state that he came to
California solely for the purpose of assisting as counsel in the
preparation and argument of numerous demurrers and motions
in the above mentioned- cases. The court recognized the fact that
there were cases holding both ways on the question of privilege
-Nelson v. McYuty, 135 Minn. 317, 160 N. W. 795, L. R. A. 1917C,

431 (1917).
"See 'imon v. De Gersdorff, 166 Wis. 170, 104 N. W. 818 (1917),
where a New York attorney came to Wisconsin to assist in the examination of the plaintiff before a court commissioner, in a pending action,
and was served with summons. The court assumed for the purposes
of deciding the appeal that the privilege existed and the question was
whether the attorney had waived his privilege. In the opinion of the
court we ~fnd this statement, "Assuming for the purposes of this appeal
without deciding the same, that the circuit court was right in holding
that the defendant, as counsel, was entitled unless he had waived the
same, to his plea of privilege while in this jurisdiction for the purpose
of attending such proposed examination of the plaintiff." . . . And
the dissenting judge says this, "It is conceded that -the appellant is
entitled to the privilege claimed . .
T Tadge v. Byrnes, 179 Cal. 275, 176 Pac. 439
(1918).
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of non-resident attorneys from service of civil process while in
a jurisdiction for the sole purpose of appearing in court to represent their clients. However the court could find no cases holding that an attorney who was not an attorney of record and did
not become such was entitled to any such exemption. So without determining, the right of an attorney of record to protection
the court refused to extend any such immunity to an attorney
not of record. This is a weaker case than any of the others which
have denied the privilege.
The last case to pass upon the question was decided by the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in 1924. 39 In that case, the facts
of which are practically the same as those in Nelson v. MoNulty,
discussed supra, the privilege was denied recognition. A Minnesota attorney on his way to York, Nebraska, for the purpose
of taking depositions to be used in the trial of an action'pending in Minnesota, stepped off the train at Lincoln, Nebraska, and
while on the depot platform was served with summons. The
court cited the Minnesota, the North Carolina and the Arkansas
cases in support of its position. It also noted the two Federal
cases as sustaining the privilege but said the better reasoning was
with the rule denying the exemption. Of coure in this as in the
Minnesota case the attorney's presence in the state was for the
purpose of taking depositions to be used in a trial in his own
state. Should a different rule apply in this type of case from
that obtaining where the attorney is in the state to attend the
trial of a cause? The testimony of the witness is necessary to
the proper administration of justice. It is very likely that the
attendance of the witness at the trial of the cause pending in the
state of the attorney's residence could not be secured. It is submitted that the rule should be consistent throughout and that
no such distinction should be made. If the attorney is entitled
to privilege while in the state attending a trial, he should likewise be exempt from service while in the state to take the deposition of a witness. There would seem to be no sound basis for
any distinction as to the effect of service in the two situations.
1"Chicago, Burlington d Quincy Railway Company v. Davis, 111

Neb. 737, 197 N. W. 599 (1924).
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SUItrMAY OF TE CASES
By way of summary we may note that of the five courts passing upon the validity of the service of process on an attorney
while attending court in a county other than that of his residence, three have upheld the service, while only two have said
the attorney was privileged. Two of the eases denying the privilege are from inferior courts and the other was decided by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas. One of the two courts sustaining
the exemption is an inferior court while the other is a court of
last resort. As far as the cases are concerned the balance is with
the denial of the privilege in this type of case. Since the two
inferior court cases are both from Pennsylvania, the states stand
two and two on the question, namely, Pennsylvania and Arkansas refusing to recognize the immunity; Michigan and Ohio upholding it. The first four cases were decided prior to 1900, and
the only case dealing with the question in the last quarter of a
century says the privilege does not exist. It would seem to us
that by far the best reasoned ease of the group is the most recent
one, that from Arkansas.
In the eleven instances when the privilege of an attorney
from another state has been asserted, seven of the courts have
refused to recognize it while only four have declared the service
void. Again we see that as regards the cases the majority recognize no such exemption. Out of the eleven cases only five were
decided by courts of last resort, and four of these were opposed
to the privilege, namely, North Carolina, Minnesota, California
and Nebraska, while South Carolina upheld it. Of the remaining, a Pennsylvania inferior court and two Federal courts
favored the immunity, while a Pennsylvania inferior court, a
Federal court and a New York Supreme court denied it. The
Pennsylvania case refusing the privilege came some thirty years
later than the one which had recognized the exemption. In the
light of that, together with the fact that in the analogous
cases 40 both Pennsylvania courts held against the privilege, we
may say that in Pennsylvania no such immunity exists. The
early Federal case denied that the attbrney was immune, but
the last two Federal courts confronted with the question squarely
4OThe two Pennsylvania cases denying the attorney from another
county the privilege claimed.
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upheld the exemption. Although we have no decision of the
United States Supreme Court on the point, we may conclude
that the Federal courts favor the privilege. As regards the
jurisdictions we have six states, namely, North Carolina, innesota, New York, Nebraska, California and Pennsylvania, refusing to grant the foreign attorney any such privilege, while
South Carolina and the Federal courts sustain it. If we were to
omit the California case from our consideration, because the
attorney was not an attorney of record, the count is still five
against two; and even if we were to leave out the Minnesota and
Nebraska cases because the business of the attorney was to take
depositions, we still have a decision of three to two against the
privilege.
If we should consider the two types of cases together, we
find that seven jurisdictions deny the immunity and only four
grant it; that ten of the sixteen cases are against any such exemption, while only six support it. Any way we might choose
to consider it we would find the majority rule to be that nonresident lawyers are not entitled to immunity from service of
civil process while in foreign jurisdictions attending court.
Mr. Browers in his work on Process and Service 41 says of the
attorney's privilege, "The majority opinion, however, seems to
be that during his necessary atteidance upon the court in connection with an action then being heard, and during his coming
to and returning from such court he is exempt from service."
This is not an accurate statement of the weight of authority, as
the summary above shows. Mr. Bowers cites section 1330 of
Taylor on Evidence. 42 We have noted that this section only
deals with arrest on civil process. The author has only cited
four of the sixteen cases, discussed supra. He could not well
get an accurate picture of the majority view from so small a per
cent of the cases, and yet his work was published three years
after the last case was decided. Likewise in Corpus Juris43 we
find this statement in regard to the exemption, "It has been held
that it does not extend to non-resident lawyers, 44 but the weight
379.

I Civil Process and Its Service, Renzo D. Bowers (1927), section

" S pra note 18.
4

Vol. 6, "Attorney and Client," section 102.

"Citing Kutner v. Hodnett, supra note 33, discussed supra.
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of authority is to the contrary.' '4 Neither is this a correct picture of the way the cases line up. The North Carolina case is
cited in a note to a subsequent statement, but we look in vain for
the Minnesota case, the Arkansas case, the CaliforniA case, as
well as the Pennsylvania cases. The only case decided after that
volume was published is the one from Nebraska. We would not
be so unreasonable as to expect an author to cite all the cases on
a point, but where the question has been before the 'courts sQ
seldom and the point seems doubtful, is it asking too much to
expect a more accurate statement of the rule?
SHOULD THE NoN-RESIDENT ATTORNEY BE PRIVILEGED?

Are the same reasons which exist in favor of exempting a
non-resident witness present in the case of an attorney from a
foreign jurisdiction? They have been variously stated; that
causes may be fully heard and justice administered in an orderly
manner; that the privilege arises out of the authority and dignity
-of the court; that it has for its object the protection of the court
and the consequent subservience of public interests; that the privilege exists solely to prevent the clogging of judicial business.
Does such service affect the dignity of the court? It is impossible to 'see how the*mere service of summons upon an attorney
while attending court in his professional capacity would in any
way infringe upon the dignity of the court. It could in no way
interrupt the orderly progress of the trial nor have the least
tendency to hamper or embarrass the dourt in the administration
of justice. 46
What brings the attorney within the jurisdiction? Is it the
order of the court? Certainly not. Is it his desire to see justice
fairly administered? This can hardly be said to be his primary
motive. Rather, it is his desire to look after the interests of his
client and in the last anaylsis his own interests. An attorney who
goes into a jurisdiction other than that of his residence to represent a client in the courts of that state, does so by virtue of a private contract and of his own motion. He is in a different position
13Citing three of the cases, discussed supra in this article, upholding the privilege.
10"The reason for this (denial of privilege) is that such a summons amounting simply to notice does not obstruct the administration
of justice nor interfere with the attendance of a party to a suit then
on trial." Els v. De Ganna, 17 R. I. 715, 24 Atl. 579 (1892).
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from the witness or'suitor. He is nbt entitled to the protection
of the court because he has entered its doors as a suitor, nor is
he in attendance in obedience to its process. Witnesses are extended the privilege, because their presence is necessary to the
complete administration of justice. The process of the court
could not compel their attendance and thus the exemption is
extended as an inducement, so their testimony my be had from
the witness stand and the cause of justice served. Is the presence of non-resident counsel such a necessity that so great a
privilege 4hould be extended? We think not. The suitor can
easily secure counsel within the state. If he be intent on retaining counsel from another 'jurisdiction that is fis own affair,
but such counsel is entitled to no special privilege. We consider
the language of the Arkansas court very pertinent, quoting from
the opinion, 47 "The selection of counsel by suitors is purely a
matter of private concern and not of public interest. It is not
essential to the administration of justice and no rule of public
policy requires that the courts should extend the privilege which
was intended for the protection of its own authority and dignity,
and to enable it to do justice between the parties, so as to grant
immunities to attorneys from their own individual liabilities."
Does the mere service of summons upon the non-resident
attorney deprive the client in any way of the services of his attorney ? This can likewise be easily answered in the negative.
The effect of the service of civil process upon such counsel does
not operate like arrest to deprive the client of his services. We
can conceive that in case of arrest of the attorney and the requirement of bail or the inability to give bail might put the client
at a disadvantage, but how a mere service of summons, amounting only to notice, could have any injurious effect is more than
we can see. Neither would mere service of process upon an attorney attending court have the effect of so embarrassing the attorney and distracting his attention from the case as to virtually
deprive the client of the benefit of counsel. If these things be
true, as we verily believe, then the public good would not be
adversely affected by such service and the rule of public policy
applied to suitors and witnesses is not applicable to the case of
a non-resident attorney.
,rPaul v. Stu key, supra, note 21.
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Attorneys within the state enjoy no privilege from service
of civil process. Why should a state extend a greater preference
to a lawyer from another jurisdiction than to one residing within
its own boundaries ? The above reasoning would tend to show
that the administration of justice does not require it, public
policy does not necessitate it, the dignity and protection of thcourts do not demand it. The idea of privilege to a certain
class or group is contrary to our fundamental principles of
government and should not be countenanced unless absolutely necessary for the furtherance of justice. The privilege
of lawyers from arrest has been modified in some states, expressly repealed in others, and in some states never existed. To
exempt non-resident attorneys from mere service of summons
is to approve a doctrine contrary to the very ideals upon which
our government was founded. 48 Members of Congress enjoy no
privilege from mere service of summons. 4 9 Why non-resident
attorneys? Is there any more reason why foreign counsel,
cing
into the state for a consideration, should be exempt from
service of civil process than a non-resident physician or member
of some other profession? Service on neither will violate the
dignity of the court nor hamper the administration of justice.
The courts of a state extend a non-resident attorney the courtesy
of allowing him to appear before the courts in special cases,
without having to go through the technical requirements for
admission to the bar of that state. This privilege he must take
cum onere, which is his chance of being served with process while
within the state. To adopt any other rule would enable foreign
attorneys to practice law constantly in the state and at the same
time be immune from the process of the courts of the state.
We have noted that, the reasons which were responsible for
the establishment of the common law doctrine of privilege from
arrest are not applicable to the mere service of summons. It is
submitted that the decisions upholding the privilege follow
""Any decision which separates the bar from the people, in sympathy or identity of privileges, would prove one of the greatest curses
which could befall the profession. From the day It is made the bar
will receive a downward impulse In the eyes of the community." Elam
v. Lewis, 19 Ga. 608 (1856).
42Usual constitutional privilege of exemption from arrest does not,
by the better view, extend to an exemption from service of summons In
a civil suit. 6 Minn. Law Review 605, and cases there cited.
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rather loosely the doctrine of the common law without a proper
analysis of the reasons upon which the doctrine was founded;
that the courts extending the exemption to foreign attorneys on
the ground of public policy suppose the presence of an element
which it is believed will on close inspection be found utterly
wanting. The sounder vieW would seem to be exemplified by
those cases in which the privilege is denied.
RoY RBERT RAY
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